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By tk *Sullivan's Island hires help to ponder its future *Bill would help area shrimpers *Johnson Creek Bridge construction to begin this summer *Festival highlights Gullah culture *Waterfront needs a nip and a tuck
Solomons P 23. tactically. Operation KA planned by Yamamoto had caused the sinking of Ryujo, the Japanese lost 71 planes from Shokaku and Zuikaka, and over 100 experiences pilots were killed, these of course irreplaceable, on the US side, 20 aircraft lost from their two carriers, and in Enterprise, 74 died with another 91 wounded. The Aftermath. In deciding to send Wasp to refuel, Fletcher had effectively removed one carrier from the area, her presence at the time of the attack may have helped to save the Enterprise, or her aircraft on additional patrols may have located the Japanese force, but it is easy to speculate on what might have been. So many times in war time, and generally in one's life, WHAT IF is asked, but all to no avail! After the Eastern Solomons, late August, and into September. But the next day, 450 soldiers came ashore from the Destroyer Yudachi, and supporting Japanese bombers sank the US Transport Colhoun trying to top up US supplies. The Japanese were making nightly runs down "The Slot" with extra troops. On the 26th. of August and east of San Cristobel, Fletcher's TF 11 with Saratoga, met up with Rear Admiral Noye's TF 18 which included the carrier Wasp. Whilst Rear Admiral Kinkaid's third TF 16, sheltering the damaged Enterprise made for the New Caledonia area. At Tongatabu, the damage to Enterprise was assessed, with an escort of the cruisers Portland and San Juan plus 4 destroyers, and a tanker she set out for Pearl Harbor on the 3rd. of September. At Pearl, repair crews slaved 24 hours a day to get her back into service. Rear Admiral Murray's TF 17, with Hornet joined up with Fletcher and Noyes on the 29th. August, thereby giving Fletcher three carriers at his disposal once more. This TF included the heavy cruisers Northampton and Pensacola, the light AA cruiser San Diego, and 6 destroyers. After TF 17 joined up, Fletcher moved south towards Espititu Santo, he would advance his force north by night, and run back south during daylight hours. All up, his three carriers had 215 operational aircraft, and on the 30th. of August, TF 18, which included Wasp, was ordered back to Noumea to reprovision, it was June since she last stored ship, and this lengthy time won her the right for a break. Early on the last day of August, Saratoga picked up a torpedo on her starboard side from the Japanese submarine I-26, injuring 12 including Vice Admiral Fletcher. Solomons P 24. Minneapolis passed a tow line to the stricken carrier, and with two engines she made good 10 knots, and was able to launch aircraft, this feat whilst under tow, was described as a "Unique performance." The Sara now sailed for Pearl Harbor to undertake repairs, arriving there on the 21st. of September. to undertake repairs. Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher relieved. Fletcher was relieved of his sea command, and took up a shore job at Seattle, then in 1943, he was given the North Pacific area, he did not command at sea again. Lunstrom in his book: "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign," comments on Vice Admiral Jack Fletcher: "History has come down hard against Frank Jack Fletcher's competence as a carrier leader, but once his decisions are studied in the light of what he himself knew at the time, a different picture emerges." But personally, I don't know about that, Fletcher lost Lexington at Coral Sea, and Yorktown at Midway. As the Expeditionary Commander for the assault on Guadalcanal in August 1942, he had promised to keep his carriers in the area for three days, but withdrew them after only two days, leaving Turner with little alternative but to withdraw all surface forces, leaving Vanderfrift and his Marines high and dry on a hostile shore at Tulagi and Guadalcanal. Now he is in Saratoga, and she is torpedoed. I still belong to the school, that judges Vice Admiral Jack Fletcher harshly for his performance as a carrier commander. By the 8th. of September, TF 18 had completed their stay at Noumea, and Noyes headed NE for Espiritru Santo, they escorted Turner's flagship McCawley, and he shared his plan to bring the 7th. Marines to Guadalcanal. Turner asked Noyes:
Noyes was non plussed by requests a and b, and quickly told Turner they were impossible, he had no spare fighters to send off to Cactus, he could not tie up his carrier in one area just to fly anti-submarine patrols to please him, now Turner put Noyes in the same poor light box, where he placed Fletcher earlier after his desertion after Savo. Solomons P 25. On the 9th. of September, Ghormley issued his basic organisation plan. TF 61, Noyes with all the carriers, TF 62, all Amphibious Forces under Turner, TF 63, Air South Pacific under McCain, and a new group, TF 64, the South Pacific Screening and Attack Force under Rear Admiral Wright. Landing US troops at Guadalcanal, Japanese destroyers bombard at the same time. On the 4th.of September, US destroyer transports Little and Gregory were landing both troops and supplies at night, at the same time, Japanese destroyers Yudachi, Hatsuyuki, and Murakumo were carrying out a bombardment. A Catalina flying boat saw their gun flashes and assumed they were coming from a submarine, dropped flares which illuminated the US ships for the Japanese just as if they were a christmas tree, and they were blown to pieces. Reinforcements for Guadalcanal. Air searches had been flown to see if there was any threat from a Japanese naval force, but at this stage nothing was uncovered. It was intended to be a two day trip from Espiritu Santo to Lunga at Guadalcanal, and a start was made on the 14th. of September. On the other hand, a Mavis ( nick name for a Japanese Kawanishi flying boat ) out of Rabaul, sighted a US carrier 123 degrees 345 miles from Tulagi. Noyes was operating about 100 miles NE of the transports to shield them from any approaching enemy force. At 1035 ( 10.35 AM ) Noyes was advised by a Catalina that he had sighted 4 Battleships, and 7 Carriers on a course 140 degrees at 17 knots 325 miles NW of him. ( there is no way the Japanese had 7 carriers operating here, and I am sure Noyes would have had the same thoughts, but, ship recognition and reports from Allied air crews were so often very badly wrong. ) Shortly afterwards, this Catalina amended his report to now read: 3 Battleships, 4 Cruisers, 4 Destroyers and 1 Transport. Now another Catalina reported a second group, 200 miles north of the first report, this was Vice Admiral Nagumo's Strike Force of 1 Carrier, 3 Cruisers and 4 Solomons P 26. Destroyers. Six Zero's quickly located and destroyed this Cat. Noyes despatched a scout group to seek out targets for Hornet's aircraft. By 1415 ( 2.15 PM ) having failed to find any US carriers, Vice Admiral Kondo's Support Force altered course to 005 degrees and retired, the probing aircraft from Wasp missed them. By 1630 ( 4.30 PM ) both US carriers had recovered their aircraft, a stalemate for both US and Japanese forces. The 15th. of September dawned to present a quiet scene, but by 1105 ( 11.05 AM ) a Bogey had come up on Hornet's radar, and a Combat Air Patrol from Wasp shot down a Mavis that had flown from the Shortlands, no one could be sure if TF 61 had been sighted, and reported, before the Mavis had been disposed of. Wasp worked her aircraft to support Turner, and at 1345 ( 1.45 PM ) having just completed flight operations torpedoes were sighted making for her starboard bow. Noyes had unknowingly crossed a line of Japanese submarines strung out from the north east to the south west. I-19 was in a great position to let go with a 6 torpedo spread, another submarine I-26 also sighted the TF, but was too far away to fire. One torpedo slammed into the starboard bow of Wasp, a second struck the hull, opening gas tanks and flooding bomb magazines. Wasp was in mortal danger, and immediately took up an 11 degree list to starboard. 8 black mess attendants, cooks and stewards died from the second fish. Counter flooding reduced the list to 4 degrees, but at 1405 ( 2.05 PM ) another huge explosion rent the Wasp, just ahead of the island, the bridge was shattered with Rear Admiral Noyes suffering burns, and Captain Sherman lucky to survive. The decision was made to abandon ship over the stern, torpedoes that missed Wasp, continued to run to the north east, and one slammed into the US Destroyer O'Brien, which sank later. ( My surname is Gregory, my wife's maiden name was O'Brien, both ships carrying our names had been sunk.) Another torpedo picked up the bow of the battleship North Carolina, flooding magazines and killing 5 crewmen, one spread of 6 torpedoes had gained a fair result for the Captain of I-19.
Criticisms on 2-1-03 Eyedrum Performances I don't blame the musicians, the music was interesting and I think they were professional enough. But the overall experience sent my mind back the Catpower in it's disdain for the audience. They could all have just sent a CD. The musicians didn't need to be there. They weren't introduced. The audience didn't know what was coming next. They were at least somewhat aware when a musician finished his performance. There was no mention of the sponsors and what they doing that might interest the audience, such improv events and future performances. Given that the music could have been phoned in and the performances / music is so impersonal, and I assume that many in the audience were e-music musicians or fans, it would have been a great opportunity for the musicians to discuss the music, how they made it, and their gear, what they thought of other e-music styles, who was doing interesting things, etc. The audience would have a chance to learn something. Having the 77 folks in the audience hearing such a discussion builds a baseline of knowledge for e-music community. It would make such an event unique and educational. Nothing made me want to see another show like this.
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